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Introduction 
The June 26th 2003 EU Council Agreement on reform of the Common Agricultural Policy 
provides the basis for the EU’s negotiating position in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
negotiations. This paper looks at the outcome of the final CAP-reform agreement in the 
areas of:  
• decoupling and cross compliance;  
• modulation and rural development; 
• the major sectoral reforms agreed; 
• with reference to the initial European Commission proposals, the extent of the 
changes introduced in the final agreement, and the broad implications of these 
changes for EU positions in the WTO agricultural negotiations on export subsidies, 
market access and domestic support to agriculture. 
The paper then goes on to consider the implications for ACP countries in terms of the 
challenges this will generate at the Cancun WTO Ministerial. It concludes by proposing 
options for ACP governments to pursue at Cancun with the aim of maintaining some 
economic space for national and regional agricultural and agro-based industrial 
development, in the face of a reformed CAP and the liberalisation of agricultural markets 
that are implicit in the WTO process. 
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The Final CAP-Reform Agreement 
Partial decoupling and ‘cross compliance’ 
Initial commission proposals and the final agreement  
According to the European Commission the June 26th 2003 agreement on CAP reform will 
mean that “in future, the vast majority of subsidies will be paid independently from the volume of 
production”.  
The new single farm-payment system will enter into force in 2005. However, member states 
may get a special dispensation to apply it only from 2007. This new system will be linked to 
respect of standards in the environment, food safety, plant health and animal welfare, as well 
as the requirement to keep all farmland in good agricultural and environmental condition (so 
called ‘cross compliance’). The ‘cross-compliance’ dimension of the single farm-payment 
system is used to strengthen the Commission’s argument that the new system of farm 
payments is non-trade-distorting (and hence should not be subjected to WTO expenditure 
disciplines), since it is related to additional costs that EU farmers must incur in order to 
meet higher standards in food safety, environmental protection, animal welfare and rural 
development. 
It should, however, be noted that the single decoupled farm payment is to be based on the 
levels of assistance received under the previous system. The agreed reference period for the 
calculation of single decoupled farm payments is the 2000-2002 payment entitlements of the 
farmers concerned. 
In the sectors where the Commission proposed to introduced the single farm-payment 
scheme, the final June 26th agreement left considerable flexibility to member states to 
choose when to decouple and whether or not to fully decouple. This was explicitly 
acknowledged by the Commission which noted “member states may choose to maintain a limited 
link between subsidy and production under well defined conditions and within clear limits”.  
Significantly the explicit intention behind allowing partial decoupling is to avoid any 
abandonment of agricultural production within the EU. 
The outcome of the 26th June Council meeting led the United States Department of 
Agriculture to conclude that in reality the final EU agreement means that decoupling will 
take place at three levels:   
1. payments that will not be decoupled at all; 
2. payments that will be partially decoupled; 
3. payments that will be decoupled later. 
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The Commission’s initial proposals involved a more extensive introduction of decoupling of 
aid payments from the production of individual products. However, when the debate with 
member states began, it soon became apparent that exceptions to decoupling would be 
required in order to secure approval of the Commission’s proposals. The Commission 
therefore recognised that partial decoupling or deferment of decoupling would be necessary in 
order to secure political agreement on the basic shift towards a system of single decoupled 
farm aid payments (a modification nominally justified by referring to the need to avoid the 
abandonment of production in marginal farming areas).  
According to the Commission’s initial proposal the overall aim of the proposed reforms was 
to “enhance the competitiveness of EU agriculture by setting intervention as a real safety-
net measure, allowing EU producers to respond to market signals while protecting them 
from extreme price fluctuations”. 
The extent of flexibility to be allowed 
In the cereals sector: member states are to be allowed to maintain up to 50% of current 
hectare payments in the arable sector linked to production if this maintains land in 
production. Alternatively 40% of the supplementary durum wheat premium may continue to 
be linked to production. 
 
In the beef sector: member states may decide to retain up to 100% of the suckler-cow 
premium and over 40% of the slaughter premium as a production-linked payment or 100% 
of the slaughter premium or 75% of the special male premium. 
 
In addition for sheep and goats a maximum of 50% of the premia can remained linked to 
production, while drying aid for cereals in the outermost regions of the EU may remain 
linked to production. 
 
The dairy sector will only be incorporated into the single farm payment from 2008 when 
the process of reform has been fully implemented. 
Member states may make additional payments equivalent to 10% of the amount of the single 
farm aid payment to encourage specific types of farming. 
 
The extent of the change 
While the Commission has been unable to secure as large a shift towards a system of single 
decoupled farm payments as initially proposed, the new system of single farm payments has 
been accepted in principle by EU member states. The Commission’s longer-term objective, 
involving a shift from product support to producer support through “the introduction of a 
decoupled system of payments per farm, based on historical references and conditional upon cross compliance to 
environmental, animal welfare and food quality criteria” has thus been firmly established as the basic 
trajectory for future reform. 
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Given that the single decoupled farm aid payment is to be based on payment entitlements 
over the 2000-2002 period the new system will effectively freeze in place, under the new 
nominally less trade-distorting system, the trade distortions generated under the old system. 
Equally the link between the single farm-payment scheme and various environmental, food-
safety and animal-welfare issues cannot disguise the fact that the scheme will serve to 
maintain EU agricultural production in the commodities concerned at levels higher than 
those that would prevail were farmers’ production decisions determined solely by the 
market.  
Implications for the WTO negotiations 
In relation to the WTO negotiations on agriculture it needs to be borne in mind that the 
Commission’s proposals for the introduction of single decoupled farm payments (and 
proposals for an expansion of rural-development measures) are designed to shift EU 
agricultural support from measures which are subject to WTO expenditure disciplines to 
those which would not be. The partial nature of the decoupling which has occurred as a 
result of the June 26th 2003 EU Council agreement means that in the coming years a higher 
level of EU agricultural aid will remain coupled to production and therefore subject to WTO 
disciplines than the European Commission initially aimed at. This in turn means that the EU 
will have less flexibility in agreeing to reductions in domestic support than it hoped. 
Given that all EU member states have considerable flexibility in determining how to 
implement decoupling it is very difficult at the present time for the Commission to make an 
accurate calculation of the expenditure implications of the agreed package with regard to the 
balance between measures subject to WTO disciplines and those no longer subject to WTO 
disciplines. 
However, at an early stage in the debate on the reform proposals tabled in July 2002, the 
Commission recognised the need to retain partially coupled payments. It probably therefore 
took this into account in the proposals it made to the WTO for reductions in domestic 
agricultural support. This means that the EU will probably be unwilling to go substantially 
beyond its existing proposals for reductions in support, since this would compromise the 
functioning of some EU agricultural markets given the partial nature of decoupling reforms 
agreed. 
How the EU sees the link with the WTO 
In future the vast majority of subsidies for farmers will be paid independently of the volume 
of production (‘decoupled’). This means that direct aids can be classified as ‘green box’ 
under the WTO agreements, i.e. non-trade distorting. They will therefore not be subject to 
reduction in the eventual trade agreement. 
CAP Reform Summary: http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/mtr/sum_en.pdf 
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The agreement on ‘modulation’ and rural development 
Initial commission proposals and the final agreement 
The Commission’s concept of ‘modulation’ involves capping the levels of support which 
can be claimed by any individual farm, by progressively reducing payments to larger farms 
The initial Commission proposal was that “all direct aid payments will be reduced 
progressively in arithmetic steps of 3% per year to reach 20%”. 
While small-scale farmers (those receiving less than €5,000 a year) would be excluded from 
the scheme, a maximum ceiling of €300,000 in agricultural support payments would apply to 
large-scale farmers. The funds generated by this ‘dynamic modulation’ would then be used 
to finance additional rural-development programmes and further sectoral reform (e.g. in the 
sugar sector).  
However, the Council agreement on June 26th 2003 significantly modified this ‘modulation’ 
proposal in two ways: first it reduced the extent of ‘modulation’, with reductions in 
payments being introduced at 3% in 2005, rising to 4% in 2007 and reaching a ceiling of 5% 
from 2007 to 2013, a quarter of that originally proposed; second, it restricted the utilisation 
of funds generated by ‘modulation’ to the financing of rural-development measures 
It is estimated that this process will (from 2007) generate some €1.2 billion per year in 
additional funds for deployment in support of rural-development programmes. This gives 
concrete expression to the political commitment to strengthening the rural-development 
pillar of the Common Agricultural Policy. The expansion of rural-development expenditures 
forms part of the wider EU effort to move agricultural support into measures which are 
tolerated by the WTO and not subject to WTO expenditure disciplines.  
Prior to the June 26th EU Council meeting, agreement was reached on the expansion of the 
scope of the EU rural-development programme to include programmes to deal with:  
• food quality assurance and certification schemes; 
• support in meeting new EU hygiene standards; 
• improving animal welfare.  
These supplement existing programmes to promote economic diversification in rural areas 
and to support the development of social and economic infrastructure in rural areas.  
 
The extent of the change 
In the light of the overall ceiling on CAP expenditures already agreed by the EU Council, 
the restriction of funds generated by modulation to rural-development expenditures would 
appear to make the financing of further CAP reform more problematical. 
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Although the European Commission is committed to putting forward proposals for further 
reform in the autumn in the sectors of olive oil, tobacco, cotton and, with variable emphasis, 
sugar, the reality is that the financial constraints may well limit the scope of reforms which 
the Commission can put forward, particularly in the sugar sector where currently EU 
consumers bear most of the financial burden. 
 
Implications for the WTO negotiations 
Deferment of reform, or an extended time frame for implementation of reform in the sugar 
sector, would be likely to maintain the EU’s need for export refunds and would compound 
problems already generated by the renewed strength of the euro against the US dollar1. This 
will reduce the ability of the EU to accept reductions in the level of export refunds that are 
tolerated by the WTO. Thus while the EU will accept reductions in export refunds 
(something which the price reductions agreed in the dairy and rice sectors make easier), the 
possible deferment or slow pacing of sugar-sector reform will place very real limits on the 
extent to which the EU is willing to accept reductions in the WTO-tolerated levels of export 
refunds. 
It also needs to be borne in mind that a growing number of EU rural-development measures 
potentially have trade-distorting effects. Of the established rural-development programmes, 
those dealing with investment in modernisation and diversification of agricultural holdings 
and improvements in the processing and marketing of agricultural products have important 
trade implications. Of the new rural-development programmes those allowing payments of 
up to €10,000 to support compliance with new EU standards and providing €500 per 
livestock unit to promote compliance with animal-welfare standards (the ‘being nice to 
cows’ payment) are a particular source of concern, since ACP country exporters will 
eventually have to comply with these same EU standards without having the benefit of such 
high levels of public support.  
This suggests a need for ACP governments to begin to question in the WTO the EU 
definitions of what constitutes non-trade-distorting forms of agricultural support, if existing 
trade distortions and new trade barriers (particularly those related to the economic cost of 
compliance with new EU hygiene standards) are not to become entrenched under a new 
nominally more trade-friendly CAP. 
                                                 
1 This is a crucial factor for export-refund expenditures as most major internationally traded agricultural 
products are quoted in US dollars. A strong euro increases the gap between euro- and US dollar-denominated 
world market prices, thereby increasing the need for export refunds to bridge the gap. 
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Rural-Development Measures with Trade Implications 
1. Financial assistance for the modernisation and diversification of agricultural holdings, 
including support for: 
• improvement of product quality,  
• health and hygiene standards.  
Such support may cover between 40% to 55% of the total investment cost depending on the 
circumstances of the farming enterprise. 
2. Financial assistance for the improvement of the processing and marketing of agricultural 
products, including support for:  
• improving the presentation of products;  
• rationalisation of processing procedures and marketing channels;  
• reorientation of production to new outlets;  
• application of new technologies;  
• monitoring of quality and health conditions;  
• encouraging innovation  
Such support may cover up to 50% of eligible investment costs providing they contribute to 
the improvement of the situation of the basic agricultural sector. 
3. Financial assistance towards meeting environmental-, public-, animal- and plant-health 
standards, including: 
• payments of up to a maximum of €10,000 per year per holding; 
• support to farmers in using farm advisory services up to a ceiling of €1,500 per 
annum. 
4. Financial assistance towards the meeting of food-quality standards, including: 
• payments to farmers of up to €1,500 per year; 
• support to consumer information campaigns by producer groups up to 70% of 
eligible costs 
5. Financial assistance for animal-welfare measures, including payments up to a limit of €500 
per livestock unit. 
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Agreed sectoral reforms 
Initial commission proposals and the final agreement 
In the cereals sector the European Commission initially proposed:  
• a 5% cut in the cereals intervention price (involving a reduction from €101.31 to 
€95.35 from 2004/5, with compensation in line with the Agenda 2000 formula);  
• a reduction of the monthly increments by 50%;  
• a modification of special payments for durum wheat to encourage quality production 
for manufacturing purposes.  
The European Council declined to cut the cereals intervention price by 5% but did agree to 
the reduction of the monthly increments by 50%. With regard to durum wheat it was agreed 
that in traditional areas up to 40% of supplementary aid could remain linked to production, 
but that this would be reduced from €313 per hectare in 2004 to €285 by 2006. In non-
traditional areas it was agreed that the supplementary aid, currently set at €139.5 per hectare 
would be progressively phased out by 2006 
In the rice sector the Commission proposed a reduction of the rice intervention price by 
50% to bring it into line with world market prices (to €150 per tonne by 2004/5). The 
European Council agreed to this dramatic reduction in the intervention price and the 
consequent expansion of direct aid payments. Direct aid payments will be increased from 
€25 per tonne to €177 per tonne. Of this €102 per tonne will be part of the single farm aid 
payment, based on historical rights while the remainder (€75 per tonne) will be paid as a 
crop-specific aid. This will be equivalent to 88% of the price reduction, in line with the 
compensation levels paid under the Agenda 2000 reforms.  
The Commission also proposed that the cereals and rice import regimes should be modified 
in line with the new market realities within the EU created by the implementation of reform. 
This proposal was accepted by the EU Council 
In the beef sector the Commission proposed a major simplification of direct aid payments 
in order to encourage safer and more quality-focussed production methods. The EU 
Council agreed that member states may decide to retain up to 100% of the suckler-cow 
premium and over 40% of the slaughter premium as a production-linked payment or 100% 
of the slaughter premium or 75% of the special male premium. 
In the dairy sector the Commission proposed a major extension of reforms in the dairy 
sector going beyond the commitments made under the Agenda 2000 reform agreement2. 
                                                 
2 Under the Agenda 2000 series of reforms, agreement was reached on the reform measures to be implemented 
in the dairy sector but the implementation of these measures was deferred.  
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The EU Council agreed to reduce the intervention price for butter by 25% over four years 
and that for skimmed milk powder by 15% over three years. Intervention buying for butter 
will be suspended above a limit of 70,000 tonnes in 2004, with this declining to 30,000 by 
2007. In line with the price reductions, compensation payments will rise from €11.81 per 
tonne in 2004 to €23.65 in 2005 and €35.5 per tonne in 2006. The EU Council also agreed 
to retain in place a dairy-quota regime until 2014/15. The EU Council further agreed that 
once these dairy-sector reforms had been implemented the dairy sector would be 
incorporated into the single decoupled farm-payment scheme. 
In addition to the foregoing major reforms the Commission also proposed changes to the 
support for protein crops, grain legumes, dried fodder, nuts and energy crops,  most of 
which were agreed by the EU Council. 
 
The extent of the change 
In the cereals sector the member states’ refusal to reduce the intervention price by 5% is 
likely to generate a continued need for export refunds to clear EU cereal markets, although 
this will depend both on how world market prices develop, and on the extent of currency 
fluctuations, relative to both the US dollar and to the currencies of newly emerging cereals 
exporters. 
In the rice sector the one step 50% reduction in the EU intervention price will bring the 
EU rice price (€150 per tonne) into line with the world market price. Intervention buying 
will be triggered should market prices fall to €150 per tonne, with a ceiling of 75,000 tonnes 
being set for intervention buying. New tariff items are to be created to accommodate the 
new rice regime. This radical reform will reduce the need for export refunds and assist the 
EU in clearing its accumulated stocks of rice (equal to one-third of EU consumption and 
three times current EU annual rice exports). It will allow the EU to dramatically reduce the 
tariffs charged on rice imports. However, this improved access to the EU market will simply 
increase competition for ACP suppliers, whilst at the same time dramatically reducing the 
prices earned on rice exports to the EU.  
In the dairy sector the 25% reduction in the intervention price for butter goes beyond the 
reforms agreed in 2000 by introducing an additional price cut of 10%. The agreed reduction 
in the skimmed milk powder price was in line with the Agenda 2000 agreement. The 
changes introduced in the dairy sector will reduce the need for export refunds for EU dairy 
products and will increase the export-price competitiveness of EU dairy exports. The 
intention is that the reforms will halt the declining trend of EU participation in the global 
dairy trade. The maintenance of production quotas will not however result in any change in 
the overall level of EU dairy production. 
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The changes introduced in the beef sector, involving as they do the continued deployment 
of direct aid coupled to production will largely maintain current levels of demand for WTO-
constrained domestic support in the beef sector.  
 
Implications for the WTO negotiations 
At present there is a high degree of uncertainty as to how world market prices will develop 
in relation to EU prices of cereals. The refusal to reduce the intervention price further will 
compel the European Commission to keep its options open in terms of the overall levels of 
export refund payments which can be made within WTO limits. However the EU Council’s 
agreement to intervention price cuts in the dairy sector which go beyond the Agenda 2000 
agreement, will reduce the need for export refunds for dairy products. The dramatic reforms 
in the rice sector will also reduce the demand for export refunds, although the rice sector 
was never a major recipient of export refunds in comparison with the dairy, sugar and 
cereals sectors. 
Overall the agreement will reduce the scope the Commission has for agreeing to reductions 
in export refunds which go beyond the current EU proposals. 
The three-tiered approach to decoupling which the EU has finally adopted (nominally linked 
to concerns over land abandonment) which allows EU member states to maintain coupled 
payments to varying degrees, will reduce the scope the Commission has to agree to 
reductions in WTO ceilings on domestic support to agriculture. 
This means that the Commission is unlikely to be willing to go beyond its existing proposals 
for reductions in domestic support. 
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Summary of the EU agricultural proposals to the WTO 
On December 16th 2002 the European Commission submitted proposals for the EU’s 
agricultural offer in the WTO to EU agricultural ministers and the Article 133 Committee. 
The EU proposal suggested that the following actions be taken over a six-year period for 
developed countries and a ten-year period for developing countries: 
• a cut in trade distorting farm subsidies by 55%; 
• rolling back budget expenditures on export refunds by about 45% on average with 
the complete dismantling of export refunds on cereals, oilseeds, olive oil and 
tobacco, provided that all other forms of export subsidy are also abandoned for 
these products (in this context the EU is calling for stronger disciplines to be 
introduced on export credits, state-trading enterprises and abuses of food aid); 
• a further opening of agricultural markets by reducing agricultural tariffs by 36% on 
average, with a cut of at least 15% per dutiable item. 
The EU is also calling for other developed economies and advanced developing countries to 
introduce EBA-style (‘Everything But Arms’) treatment for LDCs. 
The EU proposal also includes: 
• support for a ‘food security box’ involving a special safeguard instrument to ensure 
food security;  
• attempts to secure recognition for its right to protect the European model of 
agriculture; 
• promotion of the EU position on geographical designations of origin.  
• an extension of the peace clause, which prevents WTO-accepted support measures 
from being challenged.  
 
Securing support for the European model of agriculture involves gaining acceptance of the 
exclusion of internal, non-trade distorting rural-development support measures from the 
support-reduction commitments.  
 
 
The dairy sector reforms in particular will be likely to significantly increase the price 
competitiveness of EU butter and skimmed milk powder exports, and will reduce the 
dependence of this trade on WTO-constrained export refunds. The reforms will bring 
increased price competitiveness of EU rice exports, together with the removal of any need 
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for export refunds. The existence of large accumulated EU stocks could lead to a dramatic 
increase in EU rice exports in the coming years as the EU seeks to clear existing stocks. The 
situation is likely to be compounded by the projected increase in rice production which is 
foreseen under the reformed rice regime (see annex 1). 
This raises a very important point, namely the production effects of the reforms agreed. The 
Commission’s initial proposals were designed to avoid any abandonment of agricultural 
production in the EU, and the member states’ modifications were aimed at further 
strengthening this policy. This is likely to increase the incentive to produce in a number of 
sectors, leading to a rise in EU agricultural production under a reformed CAP, compared to 
the current levels of production3. Increased production is likely in all sectors except beef and 
rye, and in many sectors the surplus available for export will increase, but at much lower 
prices than those previously prevailing. ACP countries could therefore face increased 
volumes of EU agricultural exports at lower prices.  
What is more, with lower priced inputs, EU value-added food-product manufacturers across 
a number of sectors will be able to obtain their raw materials at around world market prices 
and thereby exploit the economies of scale from serving the huge internal EU market. This 
could lead to increased exports of lower priced EU value-added food products to ACP 
markets. Such a trend was already apparent following the 1992 process of CAP reform and 
the Uruguay round of tariff reductions, after which EU exports of value-added food 
products increased at an average rate of 25% per annum. ACP markets were a particular 
target during this period for EU exports of simple cereal-based value-added food products4. 
This saw the importance of the ACP market to EU exporters of these products increased 
from 12.6 % to 20.5% of total EU exports for ‘products of the milling industry’ (CN 11) 
and from 4.5% to 7% for ‘preparations of cereals’ (CN 19). 
EU Exports to ACP Countries of Cereals and Cereal Products (€ Million) 
 1996 1997 1998 % change 
Cereals (CN 10) 243 216 261 -11.2% 
Products of the 
milling industry 
201 333 336 +67.2% 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that this is with reference to current levels of EU agricultural production. The 
Commission repeatedly claims that the reforms will lead to declines in production, but this is true only when 
compared to the levels of production which would have occurred by 2009 under an un-reformed CAP. 
4 The EU agricultural reform process began in the cereals sector and developments in the cereals sector have 
always been a forerunner of broader trends in the development of EU agricultural policy measures and the 
wider development of the EU’s trade in agricultural and value added food products. 
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(CN 11) 
Preparations 
based on 
cereals, flour 
and starch (CN 
19) 
133 176 205 +54.1% 
Source: ‘Agricultural Situation in the Community’, Tables 3.6.12, 1999. 
 
This expansion of EU value-added food-product exports was seriously constrained from 
2001 onwards when WTO ceilings on the export refunds allowed on value-added 
agricultural products began to be felt by EU food-product exporters. The CAP reforms 
currently agreed could begin to ease this constraint on EU exports of value-added food 
products. 
Against this background ACP governments will need to pay close attention in Cancun to the 
rules governing special safeguard measures, in order to ensure that rules are agreed which 
allow swift, simple and effective safeguard measures to be taken in the face of increased EU 
exports not only of CAP-supported basic raw materials but also CAP product-based value-
added food products (i.e. not just wheat, but pasta, biscuits cakes and the whole value chain 
associated with wheat production.) 
 
Implications for the ACP 
The first level of implications for ACP countries arising from the new CAP-reform 
agreement is the impact it will have on the price competitiveness of EU exports of 
agricultural and simple value-added food products. In a growing number of areas this 
increased EU price competitiveness will not be the result of the deployment of export 
refunds but a consequence of direct aid payments allowing a lowering of internal EU prices 
to such an extent that the need for export refunds is removed5. 
It needs to be recognised that the EU is firmly wedded to a process of CAP reform which 
has been underway since 1992. The EU will not abandon this basic approach to its 
agricultural policy simply to secure a WTO agreement. Against this background there would 
appear to be little that ACP governments can do at the WTO to secure a meaningful 
                                                 
5 EU export refunds are designed to bridge the gap between EU prices and world market prices. If there is no 
longer any difference between EU prices and the world market prices (e.g. in the rice sector following reform), 
then there is no longer any need for export refunds. 
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reduction in all forms of EU agricultural support as opposed to a reduction in the types of 
support which the EU describes as trade distorting (domestic support). In this context ACP 
governments would appear to be better advised to adopt a strategy which seeks to insulate their 
markets from the adverse external consequences of the CAP-reform process (namely the increased 
availability of lower priced EU agricultural and simple value-added food products). This 
suggests that ACP governments should focus on securing swift simple and effective 
safeguard measures, which can be deployed in a pre-emptive way to avoid market 
disruption, through the establishment of monitoring and surveillance mechanisms for trade 
in sensitive products. 
The definition of ‘sensitive products’ should include all agricultural and simple value-added 
food products where ACP countries have a production interest and where the CAP policies 
influence production decisions and subsequently trade outcomes. 
At a tactical level this may require ACP governments to challenge EU definitions of non-
trade-distorting forms of agricultural support until such times as they have secured 
agreement on swift, simple and effective safeguard measures which include pre-emptive 
dimensions linked to establishment of monitoring and surveillance mechanism in sensitive 
products. 
This would effectively amount to a trade-off between support for EU definitions of non-
trade-distorting forms of support in exchange for EU acceptance of swift, simple and 
effective pre-emptive safeguard measures designed to: 
• prevent disruptions of ACP agricultural markets and markets for simple value-added 
food products; 
• maintain the economic space for the development of ACP value-added food-
product industries serving national and regional markets, in the face of lower priced 
EU exports of these products. 
In this context, the principle underpinning the ‘Chirac’ proposal on a cessation of export 
refunds on agricultural products to Africa could usefully be highlighted, namely that the 
deployment of EU agricultural support should not be allowed to prejudice the agricultural and agro-industrial 
development of African countries. If the European Union were to fully support this principle in 
the development of simple and effective safeguard provisions, then the precise modalities 
for the attainment of this objective under the new market conditions created by a reformed 
CAP could be worked out later. 
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The Scope for Effective Safeguard Measures 
The type of safeguard arrangement which WTO rules should be permissive of can be seen 
in the current safeguard provisions which the EU may use under the Cotonou Agreement 
should ACP exports threaten the functioning of EU markets. The Cotonou Agreement’s 
safeguard provisions allow action to be taken where imports: 
• cause or threaten to cause serious injury; 
• threaten serious disturbances in any sector; 
• threaten to create difficulties which could lead to an economic deterioration in a 
region. 
These provisions place emphasis on preventing disruption of markets through ‘statistical 
surveillance’ and ‘prior consultations’ in ‘sensitive’ sectors. In ‘sensitive’ sectors it also allows 
action to be taken without the need to document the damage being caused since the 
emphasis is on preventing ‘injury’ ‘disturbances’ or ‘difficulties’. 
These types of safeguard provisions could very usefully be applied to EU agricultural and 
value-added food-product exports to ACP countries in a context where CAP reform is 
enhancing EU price competitiveness through the redesign of agricultural support. 
Establishing ‘monitoring and surveillance’ arrangements in sensitive sectors under safeguard 
provisions mirroring those used by the EU could prevent severe market disruptions arising 
under future trade arrangements with the EU. 
 
 
The second major area to be addressed by the ACP is the impact of CAP reform on the 
value of existing ACP trade preferences. This can best be illustrated by the impact of rice 
reform on Guyana’s and Surinam’s rice sectors. These ACP exporters will now face EU rice 
market prices between 34% and 41% below current prices. They will still enjoy the same 
preferences vis-à-vis third countries that they have always enjoyed, but the value of these 
preferences will now be insignificant. Against this background ACP government should 
explore with the EU the concept of ‘compensatory trade measures’. 
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The Concept of Compensatory Trade Measures 
In the face of the declining value of agricultural trade preferences under the impact of CAP 
reform, consultations in Namibia between agricultural government officials and beef-sector 
interests had led to the emergence of the concept of ‘compensatory trade measures’.  
Under this concept it is noted that while EU beef farmers have been financially 
compensated for CAP-reform induced price declines, ACP beef exporters have not, and 
must carry the burden of lower EU prices themselves. While there is no suggestion from 
Southern African beef interests that direct financial compensation payments should be made 
to traditional ACP suppliers facing declining prices on the EU market as a consequence of 
the conscious reform of the EU’s beef regime, it is being argued that the EU should 
introduce ‘compensatory trade measures’. From a Southern African beef-sector perspective 
this could include such measures as: 
• the abolition of the remaining 8% of the special duty (formerly known as the 
agricultural levy), which currently costs ACP beef exporters around 15 pence per kg 
of exported beef; 
• a broadening of the beef product range which can be exported within the scope of 
the beef protocol, allowing the export of higher value products, thereby reducing 
dependence on declining basic commodity markets; 
• a reform of the licensing arrangements to allow greater flexibility to respond to 
market signals. 
Beyond the beef sector it could involve the elimination of all quantitative restrictions on 
Namibian grape exports. Such measures for affected ACP countries should be introduced in 
parallel with the implementation of CAP reform. 
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Annex 1 
Projected Impact of European Commission Reform Proposals 
 
 
Major Cereals Crops: production in millions of tonnes 
 2000 2001 20026 2004 20097 
Soft wheat 95.8 84.4 97.2 96.98 108.20 
Maize 38.6 40.1 40.7 40.15 41.99 
Barley 51.6 48.3 48.5 50.95 51.51 
Durum wheat 8.9 7.7 9.2 8.98 9.62 
Rice 1.55 1.43 1.49 1.70 1.79 
Rye 5.4 6.3 5.4 4.88 4.72 
                                                 
6 Figures for 2000 to 2002 are drawn from ‘Prospects for Agricultural Markets 2002-2009’ European Commission 
Directorate General for Agriculture, June 2002. For production of wheat, maize, barley and rye they are drawn 
from, Table 1.5, Chapter 1 Figures for the production of rice are drawn from table 1.15. and cover the season 
1999/00 2000/01 and 2001/02. 
7 Figures for 2004 and 2009 are drawn from the ‘FAPRI Analysis of the European Commission’s Mid Term Review 
Proposals’, FAPRI, University of Missouri, December 2002, Table 2. 
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Annex 2 
Projected Impact of European Commission Reform Proposals 
 
Major Livestock Products: millions of tonnes 
 2000 2001 2002 2004 2009 
7.45 7.70 7.57 7.28 6.94 Beef8: 
production / 
export 
0.577 0.495 0.56 0.64 0.48 
17.56 17.57 17.93 17.86 18.32 Pork9: 
production / 
export 
1.346 1.093 1.2 1.39 1.47 
8.80 9.13 9.10 8.57 9.03 Poultry10 
production11 
/ 
export 
1.01 0.97 0.96 1.04 1.06 
 
                                                 
8   Figures for 2000 to 2002 are drawn from ‘Prospects for Agricultural Markets 2002-2009’ European Commission 
Directorate General for Agriculture, June 2002, table 1.16, while figures for 2004 and 2009 are drawn from the 
‘FAPRI Analysis of the European Commission’s Mid Term Review Proposals’, FAPRI, University of Missouri, 
December 2002, Table 4. 
9 Figures for 2000 to 2002 are drawn from ‘Prospects for Agricultural Markets 2002-2009’ European Commission 
Directorate General for Agriculture, June 2002, table 1.17, while figures for 2004 and 2009 are drawn from the 
‘FAPRI Analysis of the European Commission’s Mid Term Review Proposals’, FAPRI, University of Missouri, 
December 2002, Table 4. 
10 Figures for 2000 to 2002 are drawn from ‘Prospects for Agricultural Markets 2002-2009’ European Commission 
Directorate General for Agriculture, June 2002, table 1.18, while figures for 2004 and 2009 are drawn from the 
‘FAPRI Analysis of the European Commission’s Mid Term Review Proposals’, FAPRI, University of Missouri, 
December 2002, Table 4. 
11 It should be noted that there is a discrepancy between the June 2002 Commission market predictions for 
poultry and the baseline projections used in the FAPRI model (both with regard to the production and 
exports), with FAPRI predicting lower production and higher exports for the baseline than the Commission 
June 2002 Prospects for Agricultural markets report. 
